As if last night's
counting of the votes for the presidential election had not been
exciting enough, SCAF issued a new "constitutional declaration" before midnight. If you wanna understand what that means,
please go ahead and read
A good article by Mohamed El Dahshan, explaining why it's not been a military coup, and pointing to the importance of the more or less clandestine restoration of the "emergency law":
...Hossam Baghat, head of the well-known NGO Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, tweeted on Thursday, commenting on the most recent turn in Egypt's transition.Washington Post article
by Leila
Fadel describes the situation in Cairo yesterday, one day after
the court ruling to dissolve parliament and one day before the
presidential run-off:
"Only
a few bedraggled demonstrators turned out to protest the latest turn
in Egypt’s turbulent journey — the court-ordered dissolution of
parliament. Honking cars inched past symbolic tombs honoring
protesters slain by security forces. With presidential balloting to
begin Saturday, people on the sweltering streets looked fatigue and
numb.
Even
Friday’s shuttering of the Islamist-dominated parliament by Egypt’s
ruling military generals, who were carrying out the court ruling, did
not stir much in the way of condemnation. Many of those who fought
hardest for the toppling of Hosni Mubarak now appear resigned to see
the old guard come back to power."
"Fatigue
and numb" seems an appropriate description to me. And it appears
that the revolutionaries where wrong when they claimed, in face of
the military coup on February 11, 2011 and throughout the entire
transitional period: "now
the future is ours and they cannot really take the revolution from
us'. And each time we feel this, then again we go to the streets"
(from an interview conducted in December 2011, with a 23-old student
here in Cairo). The idea that "Tahrir is always there" and
any step of the ruling powers could be met by another large protest
rested on the wrong assumption that the events of January 2011 were
nothing but a spontaneous expression of people's will. In fact
however, the large-scale processes had been preceded by a long phase
of preparation and mobilization. They did not come out of the blue -
and so today a mass protest won't come out of the blue, especially
not if people are tired and worn out by last years developments.
So if
massive protests are not likely now, is there no way to prevent Ahmed
Shafiq from becoming Egypt's next president? (Note: A president with
completely unchecked power now that parliament has been dissolved, no
constitution is in place, and the judiciary is no longer deemed
independent.) Well, there is a simple option to at least prevent a
smooth takeover by Shafiq and keep the political game open for
another round: more than 50% of those polling vote for Morsi.
To me,
that seems a viable option, in particular in face of the daunting
alternative. Yet, this might only be so because I am not worried
about the geopolitical consequences of an MB-led Egypt, and because I
don't find the idea of Islamic standards of behaviour enforced in the
public sphere too threatening. Already being in Egypt means that I
can not behave the way I am used to, that a high degree of adaptation
is enforced on me and that questions of morality are constantly on my
mind. And, to be fair, the fact that other than Egypt's religious
minorities, staunch liberals and Westernized youth, I can simply
leave and settle elsewhere if it pleases me.
For
many Egyptians however things look different (quoting again from WP):
"'The revolution is dead,' said Omnia Nabil, 24, holding an
Egyptian flag among protesters in the square outnumbered by vendors
peddling revolutionary paraphernalia. Still, she added: 'I will vote
for the devil before I vote for the Muslim
Brotherhood.'"
Ok,
wait: "I will vote for the devil" rather than for Morsi?
Either I completely underestimate the threat of the Muslim
Brotherhood, or the old regime's propaganda has been extremely
successful. For years, Mubarak and his aides cultivated the
storyline: "It's either us or the Islamists." The West and
many Egyptians bought in this narrative and supported the regime no
matter what, out of fear of ... well, of what exactly? One of Leila
Fadel's interview partners has a response, "he will vote for
Shafiq, because Islamists cannot be trusted to make good on the
demands of the revolution: 'If they win, this will be Pakistan,
Afghanistan or Iran'".
If I
had the chance to argue with this desperate (former?) revolutionary,
I would like to point out that Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran might
not be quite the same. For understanding their form of Political
Islam and their current situation, the countries' history, as well as
past and current influences of (neo)imperialist powers need to be
taken into consideration. I would side with those who say "Egypt
will never be Iran". Yet, of course, this is arguable. In any
case, however, it is remarkable that in Egypt the alternative to a
military regime and police state, "the Islamists" has
never been "tried". (This was by the way an argument of
some for voting for the MB in the parliamentary elections.)
It
seems that at the given time, the Egyptian society is too divided to
unite behind Morsi in order to prevent Shafiq. Shafiq has already
announced that he would crush any further protests after being
elected. Other than that, two recent state advertisements might give
a taste of what's to be expected from his presidency (first one with
subtitles, second one only in Arabic)
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warning Egyptians to speak to foreigners about "sensitive"
issues.
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warning Egyptians not to spread exaggerated news about the protests (in Arabic only)
"Opening soon" reads this grafitti, sprayed on the wall of the former NDP headquarters. By Zeft.
So,
more than one year down from the "Revolution of January 25th",
many people have learned a lesson. Most importantly, revolutionaries
have learned that you really shouldn't congratulate yourself on your
achievements too early. The "old" regime has probably
learned a lesson how to deal with unwanted attempts at
democratisation more successfully.
In fact, since yesterday it seems
that the regime has provided us with the perfect blueprint of how to
abort a revolution: Wear the revolutionary forces down in small
fights over time, while at the same time maintaining the promise of a
transition of power following democratic principles. Prepare
everything for the handover of power, and make sure you keep all the
oppositional forces busily involved in that process. Then, few days
before the final (democratic) battle supposedly decides who obtains
presidential power, make sure you concentrate all powers in your
hands again by following 5 simple steps: 1) get the respected judges
are on your side, 2) issue a law-like decree that grants you
unlimited power to arrest people, 3) make the judges dissolve the
democratically elected parliament, so that legislative and
constitutional power wanders back into your hands again, 4) finally,
install the president of your choice, and 5) enjoy.
This
might not be a blueprint working in other countries (coz of course we
know how different they are, even if they belong to the Arab, Moslem,
African or short non-Western world), but it definitely proved
successful in Egypt. The second round for presidency is scheduled for
16th and 17th of June, so that is tomorrow and the day after. The
competitors in the run-off are the Muslim Brotherhood's Mohammed
Morsi, and a remnant of the old regime (of the "folool"),
Ahmed Shafiq. Earlier this week, "Justice Minister Adel Abdel
Hamid issued a decree (...) giving military intelligence officers the
power to arrest civilians until a new constitution is put in place"
(POMED, 13.06.2012). As "obstructing traffic" (which pretty
much equals "demonstration") is one of the "crimes"
that military personnel can arrest citizens for, the decree's effects
resemble those of the infamous "emergency law", which had
blurred the border between police, military, and judicial powers for
years until it was cancelled after the revolution.
Other than
undermining the rule of law, SCAF also regained legislative power
yesterday by a court ruling: the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled 6
month (!) after the parliamentary elections, that they were partially
conducted in unconstitutional ways, and thus the entire parliament
had to be dissolved. Apparently, this also affects the legitimacy of
the 100-men strong constituent assembly, which had been elected by
parliament two days ago. The assembly was charged with drafting a
constitution, given that the country's constitution was disbanded and
substituted by SCAF's constitutional declaration last year. In face
of the parliament's dissolution, SCAF announced it would appoint the
members of a new constitutional assembly today.
Effectively all this
means that SCAF controls the constitution-giving body and has
re-gained legislative power after the dissolution of the legislative
body. Above that, the military has the right to arrest people as it
pleases. Oh, and last but not least, the upcoming elections are
expected to make Shafiq the new President of Egypt. Shafiq used to be
Prime Minister under Mubarak. He has repeatedly shown his
condescension for revolutionaries and, actually, citizens in general.
Shafiq promised to crush further demonstrations after being elected
(maybe that is the reason why he made it to the run-off?) and all in
all, is as anti-revolutionary as you can get. He is going to be a
president, without a parliament, without a constitution and with the
military establishment on his side. I wonder whether Mubarak envies
him.
The
reaction of Egyptian public is not yet clear, the public outcry that
I would have expected yesterday did not happen. Indignation was
limited to the media and Twitter. All the people I randomly spoke to
in the streets approved of what had happened. Either because "Mubarak
was a good man", because "The Muslim Brothers want to
forbid tourism. They want to forbid drinking - but why do the
tourists come here?", because "Parliament didn't do
anything", because "I don't like Ikhwan (the MB)."
If
you want to learn more about the bleak situation the Egyptian
revolution finds itself in, I can recommend the following articles:
Egypt,
a country lost in transition Progress from autocracy to
democracy has been complicated by tensions, divisions and violence at
every turn By Ian Black, The Guardian, Thursday 14 June 2012,
